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Abstract
This paper is about the meaning and function of identity statements 
involving proper names. There are two prominent views on this topic, 
according to which identity statements ascribe a relation: the object-
view, on which identity statements ascribe a relation borne by all ob-
jects to themselves, and the name-view, on which an identity statement 
‘a is b’ says that the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ codesignate. The object- and 
name-views may seem to exhaust the field. I make a case for treating 
identity statements as sui generis instead of attempting to explain them 
by means of the idea that they ascribe a relation. My contention is that 
once we do this, no analysis is required.
Keywords
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1 Orientation
Frege began his (1893), and with it the modern discussion of identity 
statements, thus: “Equality1 gives rise to challenging questions which 
are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between 
objects, or between names or signs of objects?” In the arguments 
which follow, Frege seems to tacitly assume it must be a relation, 
1 Frege uses the same term, ‘equality’, both for mathematical equality and 
identity. He uses ‘=’ for ‘is’ when writing identity statements, presumably to 
avoid using ‘is’ both predicatively and for identity. This might seem like trading 
one ambiguity in for another. Of course, on Frege’s view, a mathematical equal-
ity is a kind of identity statement. Since I do not wish to address or prejudge this 
question, when quoting Frege, I convert ‘=’ back to ‘is’. I also put quote marks 
around schematic sentences.
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exploring the two alternatives which then arise.2
I call these the object-ascription view and the name-as-
cription view — for short, the object-view and the name-view. 
The name-view is naturally coupled with the claim that identity 
statements are grammatically misleading (for not explicitly mention-
ing names). In Frege’s discussion, these views are intended to cover 
statements featuring referring terms other than proper names; he 
considers examples involving definite descriptions such as ‘the in-
tersection of a and b’ (Frege 1893: 26). Here I concentrate on the 
proper name case — that is, I treat the two relation-ascription views 
as concerning only that case. (By ‘proper name’ I mean things like 
‘Frege’, ‘Santa Claus’ and ‘Australia’ — I exclude definite descrip-
tions and referring words like ‘this’ and ‘that’. No doubt there are 
unclear or borderline cases, but I will not worry about that here.)
The object- and name-views may seem to exhaust the field; we 
have (with a few exceptions, more on which below) carried on under 
Frege’s tacit assumption that identity statements ascribe a relation.
The view I want to develop in this paper can be seen as a denial 
of this assumption. But this is not a thesis I wish to hold rigidly; it 
need not be harmful to call identity a relation. For example, Quine 
(1960: 116) writes that “[w]hat makes identity a relation, and ‘=’ a 
relative term, is that ‘=’ goes between distinct occurrences of singu-
lar terms”. I would not want to quarrel with this usage. My central 
point is that a relation-ascription view of identity statements leads to 
confusion because there is a fundamental disanalogy between identity 
statements and other two-termed statements, which modern phi-
losophy — in calling them all relational, and bringing the same logi-
cal and semantic ideas to bear on them — has obscured. This will be 
seen to parallel the more recognized disanalogy between existence 
statements and other one-termed statements.
So, without getting caught up in arguments about how the word 
‘relation’ ought to be used, here I wish to argue against the relation-
ascription views construed as accounts of the meaning of identity 
2 Frege is commonly interpreted as settling on a sophisticated object-ascrip-
tion view (cf. Dummett 1981: 544, Salmon 1986: 51-54 and Weiner 1999: 91-
92). Dejnozka (1981) and Thau and Caplan (2001) challenge this view. I do not 
consider this exegetical question here.
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statements (section 2), and then make clear the fundamental disanal-
ogy (section 3). Once we get used to the idea that identity statements 
are of a quite distinctive kind, they will no longer appear problem-
atic. Despite not fitting the relation-ascription model, they have a 
legitimate use, can be true and false, and can give information.
I am not the first to express dissatisfaction with both relation-
ascription views. My most notable predecessors are P.F. Strawson, 
David Wiggins (in an early paper) and Thomas V. Morris.3
Strawson’s (1974) contribution is low on argument against the re-
lational views, and the diagrammatic models he employs are merely 
described, not depicted, which makes his points less striking than 
they might have been. These models parallel ones I employ in section 
3. Strawson uses dots for objects, where I use boxes. This makes it 
easier for me to develop the models a little further, and to make their 
results stateable as well as visible.4
Wiggins’s (1965), in contrast to Strawson’s discussion, is brim-
ming with arguments against the relational views, but his proposed 
alternative is vague, unattractively similar to the name-view, and 
was not taken up again by Wiggins in any later work. Also, I think 
there are additional strong lines of attack available which Wiggins 
does not take or mention in the negative part of his article.
Morris (1984) can be seen as elaborating on the work of Straw-
son. He sees his task not as finding better objections to the dominant 
view (the object-view), but rather to show that there is a decent al-
ternative. His proposed alternative, however, is presented as a kind 
of analysis. It has faced published objections which have apparently 
gone unanswered (cf. Noonan 1986, Newman 1992). What I have to 
say, though in some respects similar, will be much less loaded (I think) 
with unclear or objectionable claims and aspects of presentation. 
3 What I say in section 3 also has points of contact with François Recanati’s 
work on mental files, e.g. Recanati 2012. Compared to what I am doing here, 
Recanati’s work is more about the theory of reference, and about constructive 
theorizing for general purposes, than about resolving the peculiar philosophical 
difficulties which arise when we think of identity statements as relational. This 
seems to be more of a difference of interest and emphasis than a difference of 
opinion, however.
4 I developed these models independently, being struck in the process by their 
power and naturalness. It was gratifying to discover Strawson’s pre-emption.
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This will be seen when I come to address possible objections to my 
approach, in section 4.
In general, there are two major pitfalls for this kind of approach 
which no one has yet succeeded in avoiding: the great unclarity of 
what it means to deny the object-view, and the urge to provide an 
alternative analysis of identity statements. I avoid the first pitfall, 
since I do not insist that the object-view is false — only that it does 
not explicate the meaning of identity statements. I avoid the second 
pitfall by maintaining that no analysis of identity statements is re-
quired, and that we should question and resist the urge to provide 
one. It may seem like we are left with a gap in our accounts if we 
turn away from the relation-ascription views. I think this is an illu-
sion. Giving identity statements full recognition as a logical form in 
their own right makes their meaning transparent, and we no longer 
need any “theory of identity”. We just move from a cruder to a more 
nuanced view of an important aspect of the logic of our language. 
I think those who desire a theory or analysis of identity statements 
have fallen under the spell, so common in philosophy, of trying to 
force a kind of statement into an unsuitable mould. My method is to 
study identity statements on their own terms — to see how they work 
and that they work, without trying to assimilate them to other types 
of statements. The urge to say something more must be checked by 
the fact that nothing more needs saying.
This is not as radical or novel as it perhaps sounds. Since Kant, for 
instance, it has become a commonplace in philosophy that ‘exists’ is 
not a predicate, existence not a property, and that existence state-
ments do not ascribe a property to objects.5 To suppose otherwise 
engenders confusion, and by carrying on in this way we do better. So 
here we have a successful case of a non-ascriptional, sui generis view 
of a kind of statement. I think we should let identity statements enjoy 
the same kind of understanding.
5 This has been reinforced by our interpretations of classical logic, in which 
all names must refer, thereby rendering questions of particular existence external 
to the system.
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2 Against the relational views
Let us begin with the object-view, since it is the more obvious view, 
as well as being contemporary philosophical orthodoxy. It says that 
every object bears a relation to itself, identity, that this relation holds 
only between objects and themselves, and that what identity state-
ments do is ascribe this relation.
The central objection to this is given by Frege in his landmark 
discussion. He begins with the observation that identity statements 
of the form ‘a is a’ are trivial and a priori, whereas statements of the 
form ‘a is b’, I quote, “often contain very valuable extensions of our 
knowledge and cannot always be established a priori” (Frege 1893: 
25). “Now,” Frege says,
if we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the 
names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate, it would seem that ‘a is b’ could not differ 
from ‘a is a’ (i.e. provided ‘a is b’ is true). A relation would thereby be 
expressed of a thing to itself, and indeed one in which each thing stands 
to itself but to no other thing. (Frege 1893: 25-26).
This is the famous problem of informative identity statements. 
The raising of this problem constitutes Frege’s initial argument 
against the object-view. I think it is a good argument. Many obvious-
ly do not take it this way, however, since the object-view is nowadays 
often treated by philosophers as though it is obviously right.6 What 
has happened might become clearer if we see what Frege goes on to 
say. But first, let me repeat that I think this simple argument gives us 
every reason to reject the object-view as an account of the meaning 
of identity statements.
Frege, for now going with the thrust of the above argument, im-
mediately raises the alternative of the name-view:
What is intended to be said by ‘a is b’ seems to be that the signs or 
6 An influential statement of this viewpoint was made by Lewis (1986: 192-
193): “Identity is utterly simple and unproblematic. Everything is identical to 
itself; nothing is ever identical to anything else except itself. There is never any 
problem about what makes something identical to itself; nothing can ever fail to 
be.” (Noonan and Curtis (2014: preface) call this viewpoint ‘increasingly popu-
lar’.) For me this passage calls to mind Wittgenstein’s (1953: §351) remark that 
“[i]t is much easier to bury a problem than to solve it”.
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names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate the same thing, so that those signs them-
selves would be under discussion; a relation between them would be 
asserted. (Frege 1893: 26)
But then he gives some kind of argument to show that this will 
not work either. Here it is in full:
But this relation would hold between the names or signs only in so far 
as they named or designated. It would be mediated by the connexion 
of each of the two signs with the same designated thing. But this is 
arbitrary. Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible 
event or object as a sign for something. In that case the sentence ‘a is 
b’ would no longer refer to the subject matter, but only to its mode of 
designation; we would express no proper knowledge by its means. But 
in many cases this is just what we want to do. (Frege 1893: 26)
This argument seems to constitute Frege’s reason for abandoning 
the name-view (which he in fact held, in Frege 1879: §8). The first 
two sentences seem quite clear, and correct. But then: “But this is 
arbitrary.” (Frege 1893: 26). That is, “[t]he connexion of each of the 
two signs with the same designated thing” is arbitrary.
Certainly, you will have two connections between name and 
object, and both will of course be arbitrary (in the sense that all 
such connections are). But why does Frege conclude that we could 
therefore express no “proper knowledge” this way? Can’t you make 
one arbitrary connection with ‘a’, another with ‘b’ and then learn 
— attain proper knowledge — that these connections are to the 
same object? Frege seems to have overlooked the fact that once you 
establish two connections, though they may be arbitrary, it is no lon-
ger arbitrary, no longer a matter of decision, whether they are to the 
same object or not. That is already determined, and you may not 
know which way.
Frege’s claim that if the name-ascription view were right, “the 
sentence ‘a is b’ would no longer refer to the subject matter, but only 
to its mode of designation”, while suggestive, is also without force. 
For what is the subject matter, here? The object — or objects, if the 
identity statement is false — designated by ‘a’ and ‘b’, or ‘a’ and ‘b’ 
themselves? The only way Frege’s point has a chance of being right 
is if we assume the former, for the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ themselves are 
plainly referred to on the name-ascription view. But to assume the 
275On Identity Statements: In Defense of a Sui Generis View
former — that the subject matter is the object(s), not the name — is 
to beg the question against the name-view!
We have now seen Frege offer one good objection to the object-
view and one bad objection to the name-view. Nevertheless, the 
main thing we see in the wake of his arguments is a widespread adop-
tion of the object-view. One reason for this, I think, is that the argu-
ment against the name-view, even though it is a bad argument, gets 
us thinking along lines such that we correctly intuit that the view is 
wrong. (This will become clearer later in this section when I offer 
what I take to be good arguments against that view.) With no alterna-
tive in sight, we are pushed back towards the object-view and forced 
to look for some way for it to overcome the problem of informative 
identity statements.
The first thing to note is that whatever strategy the proponent 
of the object-view employs, they cannot explain the potential infor-
mativeness of ‘a is b’-statements, in contrast to their ‘a is a’ counter-
parts, by appealing to any difference in what relation is ascribed to 
which objects. Of course, on this view, false identity statements will 
be held to ascribe identity to a different pair of objects from any ‘a 
is a’ statement, but all true identity statements of the form ‘a is b’ 
will be the same as their ‘a is a’ and ‘b is b’ counterparts with respect 
to the relation and object involved. Thus ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ 
ascribes the same relation to the same object (and itself, if you like) 
as ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’. The object-view’s defender must account 
for the difference in informativeness in some further way — their 
relational account of what identity statements express does not do 
the job by itself.
This is attempted in a number of different ways. One big divi-
sion here is between accounts which deny that there is a semantic 
difference, a difference in what is said, between ‘a is a’ and a corre-
sponding informative ‘a is b’, and accounts which accept that there 
is a semantic difference. The former must locate the difference in 
something extra-semantic. Leading accounts of this kind are those of 
Salmon (1986, 1989, 1991) and Soames (1987, 1989, 1998, 2002). 
Their chief motivation for attempting to account for the difference 
extra-semantically is the desire to uphold a Millian theory of names, 
on which there is nothing more to the meaning of a name than its 
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referent.7 The classic example of an account which allows that there 
is a semantic difference between ‘a is a’ and ‘a is b’ is of course that 
of Frege (1893) as standardly interpreted: he introduces sense as a 
part of semantics over and above reference, allowing ‘a’ and ‘b’, and 
in turn ‘a is a’ and ‘a is b’, to differ semantically. A major contem-
porary descendant of this approach, building on mid-century devel-
opments of Frege’s idea such as Carnap 1947 and Church 1951, is 
that of Chalmers (2002, 2004). These semantic approaches have in 
common that they locate the semantic difference between ‘a is a’ and 
‘a is b’ in a semantic difference between ‘a’ and ‘b’. Recently, there 
has appeared a semantic approach on which a semantic difference 
between the statements is admitted but not traced to a semantic dif-
ference between ‘a’ and ‘b’: Fine’s (2007) semantic relationism.
I am not contending that any of these approaches to explaining 
the difference between ‘a is a’ and ‘a is b’ are idle or gratuitous. 
As I see it, this is work which has to be done whether or not the 
object-view is to be upheld — adopting the sui generis view of identity 
statements I am arguing for in this paper does not absolve one from 
having to do it.8 My contention is that, with all these approaches, 
once the difference is explained, the main claim of the object-view 
7 These extra-semantic accounts have arguably unpalatable consequences. 
‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ is bound to say something trivial (putting aside any impli-
cation that Hesperus exists, at least). Therefore if ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ says 
the same thing, we are pushed toward concluding that what it says is trivial, yet 
expressed in a way that makes it informative. Either that, or that ‘Hesperus is 
Hesperus’ manages to express something substantial in such a way as to make it 
trivial. (Note that this is not analogous to the way a Babylonian may find ‘Hespe-
rus is visible in the evening’ informative, while not ‘Phosphorus is visible in the 
evening’: these two sentences are both capable of being informative, and if they 
do express the same proposition in some sense, then that proposition is certainly 
substantial.)
8 I favour an approach which steers between Millianism and Fregeanism; 
I count the role a name plays in a system of language as part of its meaning. 
This nicely combines the difference-making power of Fregean senses (and their 
neo-Fregean descendants) with invulnerability to anti-descriptivist arguments. 
(The individuation of roles is a flexible affair; recognizing this allows us to solve 
Kripke’s (1979) puzzle about belief.) This is not the place to develop this view, 
which is in no way required by the sui generis view of identity statements I am 
advancing in this paper.
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— that identity statements ascribe a relation which holds between 
everything and itself and in no other case — starts to look pretty 
useless as a theory. Rather than explaining the meaning and function 
of identity statements, it just becomes, at best, “something you can 
say”. And that is my position. If the proponent of the object-view is 
still to have something worth saying, they need to tell some story on 
which identity statements crucially ascribe the identity relation, but 
also “do other stuff ”. I suggest that in any reasonable story, the “other 
stuff ” would do most of the work, and the object-view’s core claim 
would be an idle cog.
So much against the object-view as an account of the meaning of 
identity statements. We have now reached a dialectical point at which 
the name-view may seem attractive. It has been out of favour largely 
for the wrong reasons, and could seem like a neglected, promising 
alternative. We shall now consider four objections to it. The first 
objection, while natural and conspicuous in the literature, turns out 
to be weak. The other three are stronger.
The Circularity Objection
The name-view says that ‘a is b’ means ‘The names “a” and “b” 
designate the same object’, but the phrase ‘same object’ here just 
re-invokes the concept of identity. Therefore the analysis does not 
explicate the meaning of ‘a is b’.
This objection can be found in Russell (1903: Appendix A, 
‘Meaning and indication’) and Kneale and Kneale (1962: 494-495). 
An elaborated version is given in Wiggins 1965. In this version, ‘The 
names “a” and “b” designate the same object’ gets explicated as ‘The 
designatum of “a” is the designatum of “b”’, and this in turn is sub-
jected to analysis according to the name-view, giving us a regress. 
But this elaboration is (a) unclear about why ‘The names “a” and “b” 
designate the same object’ has to, or ought to be, reformulated, and 
(b) inapplicable for us, because the reformulation involves definite 
descriptions, and we are considering the name-view narrowly con-
strued as concerning only the proper name case, thus blocking the 
regress.
A more fundamental problem with this sort of objection is that 
there is another way of explicating ‘The names “a” and “b” designate 
the same object’, a way which does not seem to re-invoke the concept 
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of identity. We can explicate this statement as meaning ‘There is an 
object x such that “a” designates x and “b” designates x’.9
Thus this objection to the name-view, while natural, turns out 
to be relatively weak. Fortunately, stronger objections are available.
The Logical Objection
Adoption of the name-view pushes us toward a revision of logi-
cal theory, if the latter is to retain its power. I think this revision 
plainly seems like it should be avoidable. That a revision seems neces-
sary given the name-view has been appreciated by authors discussing 
Frege’s views and Wittgenstein’s early work,10 but the point remains 
absent from many discussions which deal directly with the name-
view. Here is a simple way to see it:
Imagine a yellow piece of paper with two names, ‘a’ and ‘b’. The 
name ‘a’ itself has a name, ‘j’, and likewise the name ‘b’ is called ‘k’. 
With arrows representing reference relations, this situation can be 
represented with the following diagram:
If someone knows that a (the piece of paper) is yellow, and that a 
is b, they are in a position to infer that b is yellow. Now, in ordinary 
9 This solution to the circularity objection is adopted in Wehmeier (2012: 
796). The question of whether statements like ‘There is an object x such that 
“a” designates x and “b” designates x’ tacitly invoke identity themselves is ex-
plored thoroughly in another connection by Humberstone and Townsend (1994). 
They conclude that the claim that they do “can be resisted” (Humberstone and 
Townsend 1994: 243).
10 E.g. White (1978).
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logical theory, this argument is straightforwardly valid. In simple 
notation:
Ya
a=b∴ Yb
This is a very direct inference, an exemplar of the inference rule 
of identity elimination. Crucial to its application is the fact that the 
name in the first premise re-appears in the second.
But if we accept the name-view of identity statements, this no 
longer seems to be the case. Remember, given the name-view, the 
natural thing to say is that ‘a is b’ has a misleading surface structure; 
what it really says is that two particular names codesignate. In that 
case, the second premise should be reformulated, employing a rela-
tional term for codesignation (instead of ‘=’), and names of the names 
‘a’ and ‘b’. We have already given ‘a’ and ‘b’ names, namely ‘j’ and 
‘k’, and we will use ‘C’ for the co-designation relation. Thus re-
formulated to accord with the name-view, our argument becomes:
Ya
Cjk∴ Yb
Now, how is the conclusion to follow?
The first statement says that some object is yellow, and the second 
says that two names codesignate. For the conclusion to follow, ad-
ditional premises stating what the names designate are required, as 
well as a new, more complicated, logical principle to replace identity 
elimination. Another route, which would avoid the first step at least, 
might be to introduce a quotational apparatus, so instead of ‘j’ and 
‘k’ as names of ‘a’ and ‘b’, we would have the syntactically complex 
‘“a”’ and ‘“b”’, or something similar.
In addition to seeming to complicate these logical inferences, 
adoption of the name-view also widens the terms of reference of 
statements and arguments, apparently unnecessarily. In ordinary 
logic, in a domain containing only pieces of paper, our inference to 
the yellowness of b goes through. For the inference to go through 
Tristan Haze280
with the name-view of identity statements, the domain needs to con-
tain names as well as pieces of paper. Furthermore, on a natural way 
of extending the name-view to cover cases where the identity sign 
is flanked by variables, names become involved even for many state-
ments which do not — even to the holder of the name-view, I would 
think — seem to have anything to do with names. For example, to 
say that a and only a is yellow (that a is the yellow thing). In standard 
logic:
Ya ∧ (∀x)(Yx ⊃ x=a)
a is yellow and everything yellow is a.
This would have to be replaced by something like: 
Ya ∧ (∀x)[(∃y)(xDy ∧ Yy) ⊃ xDa]
a is yellow and everything which designates something yellow 
designates a.
Another response to this may be simply to strip logic of ‘=’ and 
everything that comes with it. But if logic loses its power to encode 
information like the above, it no longer provides any account of in-
ferences like ‘a is the only yellow thing, therefore a is yellow’. But 
these seem as logical and subject-neutral as any.11
The Language-Independence Objection
This objection is bound up with an issue touched on in the previ-
ous one — that we apparently use identity statements to say things 
which have nothing to do with names. Statements of codesignation 
and genuine identity statements can come apart, so the former can-
not be a correct analysis of the latter. I will show this in two ways: 
11 Relevant here is Wehmeier 2012. Wehmeier, dissatisfied with the object-
view, offers a strategy for avoiding ‘=’ in logic but retaining the expressive power 
that comes with it by using Wittgensteinian/exclusive quantifiers, and couples 
this with an endorsement of the name-view of ‘a is b’ statements. From a formal 
point of view, his quantifier strategy is interesting and its possibility instructive, 
but the point remains: this seems like a needless departure from standard logical 
theory. As I will argue later in the present paper (section 4), we can reject the 
object-view while leaving ‘=’ in logic largely untouched.
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one involving the distant past, and one involving considerations of 
what can be imagined.
First, consider the situation in our solar system, 5 million years 
ago. The names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ were not then be-
ing used to refer to Venus. So, 5 million years ago, ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’ did not codesignate. But it seems wrong to say that 
Hesperus was not Phosphorus then.
It may be thought that this objection can be avoided by saying that 
identity/codesignation statements are in a certain sense tenseless, or 
always present-tense, or something along those lines. I do not for my 
part see how that could plausibly be maintained, but for this reason 
perhaps the following approach is stronger:
Consider these imperatives:
(1) Imagine that ‘George W. Bush’ codesignates with ‘Mick Jagger’.
(2) Imagine that George W. Bush is Mick Jagger.
You can comply with (1) without complying with (2): you could 
imagine that the former U.S. president has always been called some-
thing else, say ‘John Bush’, and that Mick Jagger has long been 
known by two names, ‘Mick Jagger’ and ‘George W. Bush’. Or you 
could imagine that there is some third person with two names — 
one shared with the president, one with the musician. If any of these 
imaginings were actually the case, ‘George W. Bush is Mick Jagger’ 
might be true. But at least one of those names would then have a dif-
ferent referent from what we actually suppose it to have. We in the 
real world cannot correctly describe these imaginings as of situations 
in which George W. Bush is Mick Jagger.
Note that considerations analogous to these hold against a name-
view about existence statements. ‘George W. Bush exists’ does not 
mean ‘The name “George W. Bush” designates’: you can imagine 
George W. Bush having a different name. Also, you can imagine that 
‘George W. Bush’ designates someone else and George W. Bush 
himself never existed. (More generally: Things exist. This truism 
does not amount to the claim that names designate.) And of course, a 
name-view about ordinary predications also faces such problems: the 
truth of the sentence ‘John is tall’ may show us that the name ‘John’ 
refers to someone tall, but the sentence says no such thing: you can 
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imagine John being tall but being called something else.
(Soames (2014) gives a similar objection to the name-view, but in 
terms of believing what is expressed by an identity sentence despite 
being ignorant of the language it is written in. He writes: “identity 
sentences are not metalinguistic (…) since one who has no knowl-
edge of English can believe the thought expressed by (19a) without 
believing the thought expressed by (19b)” (Soames 2014: 94). ((19a) 
is an identity statement involving two definite descriptions and (19b) 
is a metalinguistic analysis of it.) This particular objection is stronger 
for the case of definite descriptions, which we are excluding from 
consideration, than it is for the proper name case, since it may be 
maintained that proper names are not really part of English.)
The Mystification Objection
What exactly does the name-view state? Does it say that a state-
ment of the form ‘a is b’:
•	 means the same as ‘“a” codesignates with “b”’
•	 has no clear meaning
•	 means nothing, or
•	 will be false for ascribing a non-genuine relation?
These all seem like holdable views, but all are alike, I want to 
say, in making a mystery (at best) out of current linguistic practice 
involving identity statements.
Take the first brand, the meaning-equivalence claim. The prob-
lem then is: how could it have come about that the ‘a is b’ form is 
used in our language to mean that a codesignation relation obtains 
between two names? Ordinarily, we use names to say something 
about the objects they refer to, not the names themselves. And this 
is no simple use-mention confusion or autonymous use of names: we 
cannot, of course, say that we really mean ‘“a” is “b”’. If the name-
view as meaning-equivalence is right, it states a linguistic fact which 
would appear to defy, and yet call for, explanation. And the puzzle 
cannot be confined to the basic form of identity statements. Here are 
two further puzzles:
‘Clark Kent has a secret, namely that he is Superman.’ What does 
this say? Clark Kent’s secret does not seem to be about two names 
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codesignating — and if it is, then how does that sentence manage to 
say so?!
Lois Lane may truly say ‘Clark Kent is Superman; he told me 
directly’, if he said to her — in his Clark Kent guise — ‘I am Su-
perman’. Now we seem to be in the position of having to interpret 
this too as meaning that ‘Clark Kent’ codesignates with ‘Superman’. 
(And remember that Clark Kent, in his office clothes, could give 
information to someone else with the sentence ‘I am Superman’, and 
this person need not know that there is any name other than ‘Super-
man’ involved. They may just conclude that Superman sometimes 
wears office attire and glasses.)
How about the second version, on which ‘a is b’-statements lack a 
clear meaning? If this version is to be distinct from the previous, on 
which ‘a is b’-statements have a “hidden” meaning, it would seem to 
imply that these statements cannot say anything clearly, and should 
be replaced by codesignation statements. But if that is the case, we 
have some explaining to do. Namely, of how people manage in so 
many cases to feel sure that they are clearly conveying information, 
very often with palpable practical upshot, when they are not. The 
same consideration holds for the remaining two views, on which in-
stances of ‘a is b’ are all meaningless and all false respectively.
3 The fundamental disanalogy
To exhibit the fundamental disanalogy between identity statements 
and relational statements (or between identity statements and other 
relational statements, should you prefer), we shall employ the fol-
lowing non-lexical means of representation: Boxes are to represent 
objects, dots to represent instantiation of either properties or places 
in relations ascribable to the objects, lines to label the properties or 
indicate the relations, and arrows (when needed) to show the direc-
tion of the relations. Thus, corresponding to ‘John is happy’ is this 
graph:
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‘John loves Mary’:
‘John told Kang about Mary’:
‘John introduced himself to Mary’:
(The letters here can be thought of as abbreviations for ‘John’, 
‘happy’ etc., or autonomous signs which stand for individuals, prop-
erties and relations. For relations of more than two places, we adopt 
the convention of placing the relation’s label next to the first con-
necting line, in the process rendering the arrow superfluous. For 
reflexive connections, as in the last example, a loop — a curved 
connecting line — is drawn.)
These graphs could be used to make assertions, like their corre-
sponding sentences. In this use, let us call them ‘graph-propositions’. 
They could also be used to model a set of beliefs, or a base of knowl-
edge, about some domain. In this use, we shall call them ‘belief-
maps’. Representations very much like belief-maps are used in many 
areas of activity — detective work, software development, geneal-
ogy, business management, and magazine reportage about romantic 
interconnections between celebrities, to name a few.
We will only need to consider very simple uses of this form of 
representation, but note that there are further possibilities than those 
illustrated above. For example, we could use this graph-proposition 
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for ‘John loves someone’:
And this one for ‘John gave something to Mary’:
(Or we might prefer to omit the unlabelled boxes, just leaving a 
dot.)
Graph-propositions like these can be seen as a partial specifica-
tions of, or constraints on, belief-maps. This is obviously true for the 
last two examples, but no less true for the others. Accordingly, we 
observe the following principle:
Incorporation principle: If a graph-proposition is accepted, 
and a belief-map modified accordingly, the graph-proposition 
will be incorporated in the result.12
We can imagine graph-propositions being used in tandem with 
belief-maps. Each person might maintain a belief-map about some 
area — and if someone asserts a graph-proposition, and they come to 
accept it, they then modify their belief-map to incorporate it, often 
in the process making many alterations to the map. And this is how 
it is in word-language. When someone asserts a proposition, and you 
come to believe it, you will typically, in the process, also change 
your attitude to countless other propositions.
12 It would also be possible to make a negative use of graph-propositions, 
which could be signified by a special symbol, akin to a sentential operator. In this 
case a non-incorporation principle would be natural. Note in this connection that 
I am not claiming that the incorporation principle as stated above would hold for 
all possible extensions of technique of graph-propositions. The point is that the 
principle is a natural one for the sorts of examples we are considering.
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In asserting a sentence, one as it were says: ‘Whatever you do, 
assent to this.’ This is particularly clear with propositions we accept 
with some difficulty. You cannot just accept a proposition by itself 
and leave everything as it is; you must accommodate it. This accommo-
dation corresponds to the full incorporation of a graph-proposition. 
The asserter of a graph-proposition is in effect saying: ‘Whatever you 
do, make part of your belief-map look like this.’
Now we are in a position to consider the following question: 
What might be a suitable graph-propositional correlate to an iden-
tity statement, for example ‘Clark Kent is Superman’? Well, what 
would the dominant view (the object-view) suggest? Presumably, 
since identity statements ascribe a relation on this view, a connecting 
line will be involved. Modelling ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ on ‘John 
loves Mary’, we get:
Or, building the symmetry of identity statements into the 
graph-proposition:
But these are not suitable correlates, for they would not satisfy 
the incorporation principle. We can see this by asking: What kind of 
changes might one make to a belief-map upon accepting an identity 
statement, given in words? Suppose Lois Lane, prior to accepting the 
identity statement, believed that Clark Kent worked in an office, and 
that a separate individual, Superman, fought crime. So her belief-
map would incorporate:
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Upon accepting that Clark Kent is Superman, we can imagine 
Lois Lane accommodating this by, among other things, supposing 
that this individual — Clark Kent, Superman — changes clothes 
in phone-booths when no one is looking. Her resulting belief-map 
would not incorporate the suggested correlates. Rather, she would 
change it to look like this:
where ‘c’ stands for something like ‘changes clothes in phone-booths’. 
Thus if we still want to represent Clark Kent’s being Superman us-
ing a relation line, without flouting the incorporation principle, we 
should have to have:
But this loop could have no significance, for everything is identi-
cal to itself. We could put it in every box. Since this device could 
serve no purpose, let us forbid it. Omitting it, we get:
Or simply:
And thus we have arrived at a suitable graph-propositional cor-
relate to ‘Clark Kent is Superman’, satisfying the incorporation 
principle.
(Note the similarity with ‘Clark Kent is Superman’, if we con-
sider ‘is’ as a kind of connector and separator here — not so different 
from its use in ‘Clark Kent is smart’ — rather than standing for a 
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relation.13)
The fundamental disanalogy between identity statements and re-
lational statements can now be stated in this way: an identity state-
ment’s most suitable graph-propositional correlate is of a completely 
different form from that of a relational statement.
Another interesting feature of the technique of graph-propo-
sitions is that there is no natural correlate to trivial identity state-
ments, or at least none of the same form as the correlate of a po-
tentially informative identity statement. I.e., a belief-map would not 
contain something like:
Or at least this could serve no purpose. We are therefore free to 
forbid it, as we did with “identity loops” above. Now, the above, as a 
graph-proposition, does not satisfy the incorporation principle. All 
we have left to opt for as a correlate to ‘a is a’ is:
And this is not of the same form as a correlate to a potentially in-
formative identity statement. Thus no “problem of informative iden-
tity” arises for graph-propositions.
This shows us that there is no problem for word-language either, 
seen clearly. We are led astray by the formal similarity between iden-
tity statements and relational statements in our language, and by the 
highly various and complicated use we make of these forms. We do, 
for instance, sometimes utter repetitive ‘is’ sentences. We might say 
‘John is... John’ to indicate that he is a quite singular person, or per-
haps suggesting that one can’t say much about John without being 
impolite, as we might do equally well with: ‘What can I say?’. These 
uses go with characteristic gestures and tones of voice. Also, we have 
13 This conception is expressed in a footnote in Wertheimer (1998: 180 fn. 
3): “The ‘is’ of both identity and predication is a semantically empty functional 
expression ordering pairs of terms to form sentences.” Note that it is no objection 
to this to point out that ‘a is b’ is equivalent to ‘a is identical to b’, ‘a is the same 
object as b’, and numerous other expressions. After all, ‘a is red’ is equivalent to 
‘a possesses the property of being red’ as well.
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the dictum that “every thing is what it is, and not another thing” 
(Butler 1726: preface), which somehow manages to be a useful re-
minder in philosophy. It should be clear, however, that none of these 
uses plays anything like the role that ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ might 
play for Lois Lane. It is that kind of use which is explicated with the 
technique of graph-propositions.
Graph-propositions make it clear as day why ‘a is b’-statements 
can embody empirical information in that way, while ‘a is a’-state-
ments never find any such use. We can, if we want, say that ‘Clark 
Kent is Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ both ascribe the 
relation of identity, but that does not explicate their meaning. They 
are different sentences with different uses.
4 Possible objections answered
Objection 1: Standard logic treats identity as a relation. What are 
you going to do about that?
Reply: Axioms and rules of inference involving ‘=’ can remain 
as they are, but we should understand this symbol as being funda-
mentally different from (other) relational terms. To some extent, we 
already do: ‘=’ is distinguished by being treated as a logical constant. 
To take the separation further, the grammars of logical languages 
could treat ‘=’ as the sole member of its own category of expression, 
but this amendment would not change which formulae get recog-
nized as grammatical.
The main thing which needs rethinking is the standard model-
theoretic semantics for ‘=’. Roughly speaking, instead of saying that 
a certain relation holds between all objects and themselves only, and 
that an ordered pair <o1, o2> satisfies ‘x = y’ iff o1 bears this relation 
to o2, we could leave out any talk of this relation, and just say an 
ordered pair <o1, o2> satisfies ‘x = y’ iff o1 is o2, i.e., iff the ordered 
pair is repetitive. This appears no less rigorous than the common 
procedure (which to my mind has, by comparison, the aspect of a 
logical trick).
Objection 2: You give no account of what happens when some-
one accepts an identity statement and then changes their mind.14
14 This objection is made in Noonan 1986 to the Strawson-Morris approach.
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Reply: That is true, but no such account was needed for our task 
— to break the grip of the way of thinking which made a relational 
view of identity statements look inevitable. And what has been said 
here hardly blocks the way to understanding mind-changing; if Lois 
Lane accepted but then changed her mind about Clark Kent being 
Superman, she would adjust her belief-map to be like it was before, 
but perhaps with added information about having been misled, cer-
tain misleading appearances, etc.
That we can do such things is certainly a remarkable fact of 
nature. I, of course, have no special duty to explain it. But it may 
be helpful in this connection to note: if two names ‘a’ and ‘b’ are 
used interchangeably by all competent speakers, the denial of ‘a is 
b’ would have no clear meaning — we could not begin to accom-
modate it. Identity statements, and denials thereof, have their char-
acteristic uses in quite particular circumstances.
Objection 3: What you say about graph-propositional correlates 
may be well and good, but you have made no contribution to answer-
ing the question of what identity statements say.15
Reply: If knowing what a statement says consists in understand-
ing its meaning and use, then graph-propositions can contribute to 
this. But they are no part of any project to say, definitively, what 
identity statements say. I think this sort of philosophical task, in an 
instance such as this, is stranger than is commonly perceived.
Let us stop to reflect on the practice of asking and answering the 
question of what something says, apart from any specialized philo-
sophical instances. Consider these cases:
•	 Asking what is said by a sentence of a foreign language.
•	 Hearing of an inscription on the inside of an urn — asking 
what it says.
•	 Explaining, precisely, the conventional meaning of ‘The av-
erage man has 1.4 children’.
•	 Rendering, e.g., ‘Insouciance was ubiquitous’ in more com-
mon language.
15 An objection to Morris like this one (but not in terms of graph-proposi-
tions) appears in Newman 1992, except Newman also suggests that perhaps Mor-
ris thinks that identity statements say nothing. Obviously, that is not my view.
291On Identity Statements: In Defense of a Sui Generis View
•	 Replacing an unnecessarily long and involved sentence with a 
better-constructed one.
•	 Summing up what is said in an article, book, speech etc.
‘Clark Kent is Superman’, however, appears to be about the plain-
est, simplest expression in English of what it says. I would suggest 
that any philosophical puzzlement about such statements is not to be 
alleviated by a theory of what identity statements say, but by recog-
nizing that they are logically and semantically sui generis. (‘Saying 
what identity statements say’ should be compared with ‘saying what 
subject-predicate statements say’ — not, for example, ‘saying what 
velocity statements say’.)16
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